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As capacity for severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus
2 (SARS-CoV-2) diagnostics has expanded, both with assay types
(nucleic acid amplification tests, NAATs, antigen tests, and serol-
ogy) and specimen collection options (nasopharyngeal, NP;
oropharyngeal, OP; saliva; mid-turbinate, MT; anterior nares,
AN), interest in the use of routine, serial screening of asympto-
matic individuals in a variety of settings has expanded. Notably,
the use of asymptomatic surveillance in higher education1 and pro-
fessional2 and nonprofessional athletics3 has become common-
place, but transmission in these settings has also been linked to
lapses in implementation of basic infection prevention practices
such as masking and physical distancing.4–6 Given the considerable
interest in asymptomatic surveillance in areas outside of health-
care, the question of the utility of routine screening among health-
care personnel (HCP) in acute-care facilities has been raised.
In this focused review, we describe the reported risk of acquis-
ition of infection after HCP exposures to occultly infected patients,
the risk acquisition of infection by patients exposed to occultly
infected HCP, and the prevalence of asymptomatic infection
among HCP in settings where screening has been implemented.
We also assess the potential role or routine surveillance of asymp-
tomatic HCP to reduce the risk of nosocomial transmission from
HCP-to-HCP and HCP-to-patient. We report on the early experi-
ence of acute-care facilities that have offered screening of asymp-
tomatic HCP outside confirmed exposures, and we conclude with
considerations for facilities considering offering screening, either
“on demand” or as part of routine surveillance.
Risk of HCP infection after exposure to occultly infected
patients
Multiple infection preventionmeasures in healthcare facilities have
been widely implemented, including universal masking of HCP,
patients, and visitors, screening for symptoms and exposures
and appropriate isolation of patients and visitors, testing of symp-
tomatic patients as well as targeted testing of asymptomatic
patients (ie, after known exposures, prior to or upon admission
to a healthcare facility, and prior to specific high-risk procedures)
as well as appropriate isolation and use of personal protective
equipment (PPE) byHCP for patients with suspected or confirmed
COVID-19.7,8 In this setting, the risk of transmission from occultly
infected patients appears to be low. This assessment is based on
several published investigations of exposures to HCP (Table 1)
demonstrating association between universal masking and
decreasing incidence of infection.9 In addition, seroprevalence
studies have generally failed to demonstrate an association between
caring for patients with suspected or known COVID-19 and HCP
infections, but they have shown relationships between household
contacts10 and lack of universal mask use when caring for
patients.11 Several healthcare facility clusters of HCP infection,
however, have been linked to HCP-to-HCP transmission tied to
eating, drinking, carpooling, and other social events during which
infection prevention measures were not followed.12–14
Risk of patient infection after exposure to occultly
infected HCP
At least 1 study has systematically approached the risk to exposed
patients from occultly infected HCP, estimated at 0.4%. Baker
et al15 identifed exposed patients between March and June 2020.
After the study had begun, based on changes in public health guid-
ance, all exposed patients were referred for testing regardless of
symptom status. During this time, 238 exposed patients were iden-
tified, some with >1 exposure, for 253 exposures by 60 HCP. In 87
exposures, neither patient nor HCP were wearing face masks; in
166 exposures, only the HCP was wearing a face mask. Testing
for SARS-CoV-2 by PCR was performed in 92 of 253 exposures,
of which 2 resulted positive. The first exposure included unmasked
face-to-face interaction for 30 minutes in the outpatient setting,
and the second patient was unmasked for 10 minutes with a
masked infected HCP, but this patient was also identified as the
close contact of a household case, and the infection was attributed
to the household.
Prevalence of asymptomatic infection among HCP
Some academic health centers have offered testing to asympto-
matic HCPs without known exposures (ie, for indications other
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Table 1. Risk of Infection After HCP Exposure to Occultly Infected Patients
Publication Date, Country
Brief Description of Occultly
Infected Patient and Exposure Details Regarding PPE
HCP Exposed,








Patient with occult COVID-19
admitted to hospital; developed
respiratory distress on HD 2,
intubated by emergency airway
team; difficult intubation requiring
use of video laryngoscope and
airway bougie; mechanical ventila-
tion ×3 d; NP positive for SARS-CoV-
2 upon extubation
35 HCP wore surgical masks; 6 wore
N95 respirators
41 HCP with expo-
sure to AGP for at
least 10 min <2 m
from patient.
0 All HCP isolated for 2 weeks during
which they had daily symptom
monitoring, twice daily temperature
measurements; NP swabs processed
by PCR on first day of home isola-
tion (day 1, 2, 4, or 5 after last







Contact tracing of 12 patients with
travel-related COVID-19, including
222 HCP with close contactb
Not described. 222 0 Active symptom monitoring during
exposure window; only sympto-
matic exposed individuals were
tested for SARS-CoV-2 by PCR. The
numbers of HCP who developed
symptoms and were tested are not
specified. Threshold for testing in
HCP might have been lower than







Patient managed on standard
precautions for 4 days during
which the patient underwent
multiple AGPs, including nebulizer
treatments, bilevel positive airway
pressure, endotracheal intubation,
and bronchoscopy; identified as
SARS-CoV-2 after transfer to another
facility (see Bays et al22 for exposure
investigation of this patient at the
second hospital)
HCP stratified as high, medium, and
low risk per CDC; risk stratification
provided for 43 who developed
symptoms and were tested: high
(n=5), medium (n=36), and low
(n=2). Among 3 diagnosed with
COVID-19, 2 had high risk (frequent
close contact during BiPAP, intuba-
tion with no facemask, respirator,
gown or gloves) and 1 had medium
risk exposures (close contact for 2 h
wearing a face mask inconsistently;
wearing gloves, no eye protection)
121 3 Active symptom monitoring during
the exposure window; only sympto-
matic exposed individuals were
tested for SARS-CoV-2 by PCR.
2.5%







related to 2 occultly infected
patients. Patient 1 was transferred
on from a community hospital
(community hospital exposure is
described in Heinzerling et al21) to
hospital B. Patient 2 was transferred
from another community hospital
to hospital B and was on standard
precautions for 14 days prior to
suspicion for COVID-19 during which
the patient was intubated and had
bronchoscopy performed.
Patient 1 exposures included high
(n=15), medium (n=73), and low
(n=59) risk.
Patient 2 exposures included high







Active symptom monitoring during
the exposure window; only sympto-
matic exposed HCP were tested for
SARS-CoV-2 by PCR.
Active symptom monitoring during
the exposure window; symptomatic
and a subset of asymptomatic
exposed HCP were tested for SARS-
CoV-2 by PCR. Of 5 confirmed cases,
4 were present for intubation with-
out adequate PPE, the fifth had
direct contact for several days with-
out PPE and during a break in the
vent circuit. Two possible cases
were among staff who had direct















Person-to-person spread in house-
hold between 2 patients and report
of exposures from those two
patients within community and
healthcare setting
Not described however, healthcare
exposures from patient 2 are noted
in non-hospitalized settings because
the patient was appropriately iso-
lated upon admission.
75 0 Active symptom monitoring during
the exposure window; symptomatic
exposed individuals were tested for
SARS-CoV-2 by PCR; a subset of







Prospective case study of confirmed
COVID-19 patients and their close
contacts; 698 close contacts were
identified in healthcare settings.
Close contact defined as contacting
the index case within 2 m without
appropriate PPE; no minimum time
requirement. Appropriate PPE
depended on the exposure setting;
during AGPs, N95 required.
698 6 Active symptom monitoring during
the exposure window; symptomatic
exposed individuals were tested for
SARS-CoV-2 by PCR; asymptomatic
HCP were also tested as they were
considered high-risk population.
Repeat testing of asymptomatics
only conducted if symptoms devel-







Patient admitted to hospital and on
Standard Precautions through HD
13 at which point he developed
acute respiratory failure; determina-
tion made that he was likely
infected at the time of admission.
The patient was not wearing a
mask; on HD7, a new universal
masking policy went into effect and
HCP work surgical masks.
Close contacts defined as≥ 10
cumularive minutes of face-to-face
contact within 2 m. Median cumula-
tive time with patient was 45 m
(range, 10–720 min)
43 2 Active symptom monitoring; all
exposed HCP were offered testing
for SARS-CoV-2 by PCR, regardless
of symptoms. 8 of 44 developed
symtpoms and 3 tested positive. Of
36 asymptomatic HCP, 29 were
tested and all negative. One HCP
who was identified as infected was
determined to have had a house-
hold exposure and thus was




Note. HD, hospital day; NP, nasopharyngeal; PCR, polymerase chain reaction; HCP, healthcare personnel; AGP, aerosol-generating procedure.
aHospital A in Heinzerling et al21 is described in detail in Bays et al,22 where hospital B is also described. Data presented for Heinzerling include only those from hospital A. Data included from Bays et al pertains to hospital B contact tracing investigation
(investigation 1A and 2).
bClose contact defined by CDC at the time: “Examples of close contact with a patient or with infectiousmaterial could include spending prolonged timewithin 6 feet of the patient, conducting or being present during an aerosol-generating procedure, or direct
contact with the patient’s secretions or excretions.”







than those recommended at this time). We are not aware at this
time of any such practices that are mandatory, or that require
repeated testing. A limited review of existing programs and results
are provided (Table 2). The overall prevalence among this popu-
lation is uniformly low and approximates that of institutes of
higher education that have implemented routine serial screening.
The Massachusetts Department of Public Health, which tracks the
7-day weighted average of tests by molecular methods, notes a
recent positive rate of 0.3%.16
Potential benefits of asymptomatic HCP screening
Testing of asymptomatic HCP will identify some infections that
will otherwise go undetected due to lack of prompts for evaluation.
The impact of identifying those cases on nosocomial infection is
not clear. Although asymptomatic individuals do transmit infec-
tion, available literature suggests that the secondary attack rate
from asymptomatic individuals is less than for those with symp-
toms.17 More importantly, in the healthcare setting when adher-
ence to infection prevention protocols are in place, the risk of
transmission to patients and other HCP appears low. The effect
of identifying occultly infected HCP on reduced transmission in
the community or household setting is likely higher because of
the types of interactions in households, and household settings
have been shown to have the highest rates of secondary transmis-
sion.18 The HCP infection risk is likely higher in community and
household settings than in healthcare settings; thus, the identifica-
tion of asymptomatic HCP may have its greatest effect in limiting
transmission in the household setting.
Outside a potential impact on reducing transmission, there may
be noninfection prevention benefits to offering HCP testing,
including HCP satisfaction through ease of access and some mea-
sure of reassurance. This reassurance of a negative test, however, is
short-lived and runs a risk of reducing compliance with necessary
infection control procedures.
Potential disadvantages of asymptomatic screening
Will HCP who test negative for SARS-CoV-2 modify their behav-
iors in a way that could increase risk of transmission, by engaging
in more risky behaviors, such as eating or drinking in close prox-
imity with nonhousehold members? Although we are not aware
of evidence to support this change in behavior during the current
pandemic, observations of lack of compliance with eye protection
in our own institutions in settings in which inpatients are all
tested for SARS-CoV-2 on admission suggest that HCP are
assessing risk of transmission from patients and altering their
behavior accordingly (ie, not wearing eye protection when the
patient tested negative despite the existing policy to wear eye pro-
tection universally).
Even in such a low-prevelance population, the risk of false-
positive results, which has generally been very low in nucleic acid
amplification tests (NAATs) but higher with some antigen tests,
must also be considered. Facilities will need to decide in advance
whether all positive results will be considered to be true infec-
tions, or whether additional assessment of each case is required
to confirm or refute active infection, taking into account the
impact on return-to-work status and exposure investigations.
We are unaware of data on testing of asymptomatic HCP in which
positive tests were confirmed as “true” positives by follow-up
serologic tests.
Practical considerations
Any healthcare facility considering asymptomatic HCP screen-
ing either as voluntary or mandatory programs must be aware of
practical considerations, such as the frequency of testing, the
type of assay, the specimen type, and pooling strategies, all of
which can affect the sensitivity of the assay and the timing of
detection. Observed self-collection may be an option depending
on the specimen type and may introduce efficiencies in testing
cohorts of HCP at the same time, with appropriate infection
Table 2. Reported Prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 Infection Among Asymptomatic HCP





Detected Rate Type of Test Reference
Brigham and Women’s
Hospital, 9/25/2020a
Testing of asymptomatic employees was initiated
as part of a hospital cluster, though offered
broadly to all employees on campus.
10,840 in
7,999 HCP





Asymptomatic employees without known exposure
were offered voluntary testing, free of charge; limit
1 per week.




Health patient care provid-
ers, 5/21/2020; NIH cam-
pus, 8/11/2020
Asymptomatic testing was voluntary but highly
encouraged; clinical staff are encouraged to test
weekly. Pooled specimen approach was used.
38,450 in
8,578 HCP
33 0.4% Initially NP swab; beginning
9/14/2020 saliva; mid-turbi-





Voluntary testing of asymptomatic employees,
trainees, and students, randomly selected, was
offered in addition to asymptomatic testing for
new and returning trainees and students, new
campus housing tenants, childcare staff working in
UCSF’s childcare centers, and others.
16,702 in
7,627 HCP
b 0.21% Self-administered, observed,
AN
29, 30
Yale New Haven Health
System, June–July 2020
Voluntary testing of asymptomatic HCP 11,000 28 0.25% Details not available 31
Note. HCP, healthcare personnel; AN, anterior nares; NP, nasopharyngeal; NIH, National Institutes of Health; UCSF, University of California–San Francisco.
aScreeningwas initiated in the setting of a cluster of infections though vastmajority of testingwas performed in nonexposedHCP. Total infections presented are those that were not attributed to
the cluster, and these 14 were removed from the denominator for calculation of proportion positive.
bData provided did not allow identification of asymptomatic denominator.
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prevention protocols in place. Unobserved self-collection
should be undertaken with caution given the possibility of poor
sample collection and false-negative results. In low-prevalence
populations, false-positive results may be a concern, and facili-
ties may consider protocols to follow-up positive screening tests
with confirmatory or other tests. Facilities may consider
whether to offer testing to all HCP or specific groups; however,
caution should be taken when focusing on those HCP consid-
ered at “higher risk of infection” due to direct patient care
because the most likely source of infection in all HCP is com-
munity exposure. Thus focusing on HCP with higher risk of
unrecognized community exposures may be considered. Some
facilities may alternatively undertake surveillance among
HCP in whom infection would pose a greater risk to patients
based on the types of interactions or patient populations with
whom they interact. This strategy should also be considered
with caution because the risk to exposed patients when infection
prevention measures are in place (ie, universal masking of HCP,
daily symptom monitoring, and masking of patients whenever
possible) is low.
In addition to the cost of establishing and maintaining a testing
program, the additional resources that will be required for contact
tracing to identify potential exposures to otherHCP or patients due
to lapses in infection prevention protocols must be considered.
These include staffing and other support from infection prevention
programs and occupational health staff. The demand for testing
may exceed budgeted resources.
In summary, the low risk of nosocomial transmission from
patient to HCP and from HCP to patient, as well as the low
prevalence of asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection among
HCP suggests that current infection prevention measures in
place are effective. The addition of routine asymptomatic sur-
veillance to decrease transmission in healthcare facilities should
not be pursued as a primary infection prevention strategy, and
institutions that consider offering such screening will need to
consider the many practical implications. With increasing com-
munity prevalence across much of the United States, reinforcing
the known, effective infection prevention strategies is of para-
mount importance. Healthcare does not operate in a bubble
and routine screening of asymptomatic HCP will not create one.
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